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PORTUGAL

The abortive military rebellion which was crushed by pro-government forces has claimed its first political victims, Army Chief of Staff Carlos Fabiao and security chief Otelo de Carvalho. The government announced that both resigned yesterday, but did not link their resignations with the leftist rebellion.

The anti-Communist majority in the Revolutionary Council had sought their dismissal for weeks because both men openly encouraged leftist dissident groups within the armed forces.

General Fabiao, once one of Portugal's most highly respected military officers, has received much of the blame for the divisive political factionalism in the army. Last month, he was severely criticized for giving in to the demands of rebellious soldiers in the north. On several occasions recently, he appeared to give his approval to radical movements in the military. He has been replaced temporarily as army chief of staff by an obscure infantry lieutenant colonel.

Inasmuch as Carvalho was stripped of his commands earlier this week, his resignation was largely pro forma. Carvalho is widely credited with having planned and executed the April 25, 1974 coup which ended nearly 50 years of authoritarian rule. He had become the standard-bearer of the radical left, however, and in recent weeks the Communists also rushed to his defense as he came increasingly under attack for his failure to support government policies.

President Costa Gomes has announced that the government will withhold judgment on who was responsible for the paratroopers' rebellion until an official inquiry can be held. Fifty one officers and enlisted men captured during the uprising are being held under detention in the north.

In the absence of formal charges, both the Socialist and Popular Democratic parties have rushed to seize the political initiative by blaming the Communists. Socialist leader Mario Soares said the "principal guilt" rests with the "minority parties"—a euphemism for all parties left of the Socialists—headed by the Communists. The Popular Democrats charged that the Communists were guilty of creating the conditions which led to the mutiny. While Communist Party members discreetly avoided any direct participation, military officers believed to have close ties to the party did appear to play a major role. The Communists are also vulnerable because of their strident calls for the government's resignation just prior to the rebellion.

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On Wednesday, both Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Melo Antunes were quick to reassure the public that the leadership would continue to pursue its aims now that the major leftist opposition in the military has been crushed. The President reiterated his faith in a democratic, pluralistic system for Portugal, saying that legislative assembly elections—scheduled for early next spring—would be held as promised.

Antunes, firmly rebutting Communist demands for revamping the government, said that leftist criticism of its present composition had been unfounded and that it was entirely capable of carrying out its duties. Antunes added that the political parties—the Communists included—will continue to play an essential role in the revolution.



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SPAIN

The limited pardon issued by Spanish King Juan Carlos on November 26 appears to have done little to heal political wounds or reduce the prospect for an open break between the new regime and the leftist opposition.

Yesterday, as 81 foreign delegations—including the presidents of three Common Market countries—met in Madrid to honor the new King, the Spanish government continued its censorship policies by seizing the latest edition of the country's leading political weekly magazine because it contained a speculative article about Juan Carlos' liberalization plans. On Wednesday, police had announced the arrest of 30 young people, mostly students, in northwestern Spain for holding an illegal political meeting, and there were scattered reports of other arrests elsewhere in Spain.

Many leftists reacted angrily to the King's royal pardon, and riot police yesterday broke up two demonstrations—in Madrid and in the Basque city of San Sebastian—in which noisy crowds demanded total amnesty for political prisoners. The political opposition has been calling on Juan Carlos to grant a general amnesty for the roughly 2,000 political prisoners held in Spanish jails as a token of his serious intention to carry out meaningful reforms.

The Socialist Workers Party, the largest non-Communist opposition group, pointed out that even Franco had approved several similar pardons and charged that the decree showed only that nothing had changed in Spain. Opposition Christian Democrats were also disappointed, although they were more willing to look on the pardon as a "positive step" which might be followed by others.

The decree has come under heavy criticism for the vagueness of its wording. Much will depend on how the Justice Ministry interprets the law. The decree provides for the reduction of prison sentences for political and common crimes, for example, but it does not apply to terrorists, Communists, anarchists, separatists, and certain kinds of monetary crimes. Opposition lawyers fear that the government could limit application of the amnesty to common criminals and ignore political prisoners entirely.

The decree also commutes death sentences that have been or might be imposed for crimes that were committed prior to Juan Carlos' investiture on November 22—except for terrorists being tried under last August's anti-terrorist law. The Communists will probably view this exclusion as confirmation that the government's strategy is to try to isolate the party from the rest of the left. To counter this the

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party is trying to stir up broad opposition to the government. The Communists have had little success in this effort so far, however, and the Communist-dominated workers' commissions reportedly have now backtracked on their earlier call for a national general strike within a week or 10 days of Franco's death.

According to a US embassy source, the attempt to convoke a crippling national strike has been postponed until conditions are more propitious. In the meantime, the Communist Party and the workers' commissions plan to instigate a series of local "days of struggle" to help create a more favorable climate for a general strike. The first of these localized strikes is planned for next week and will be limited to construction and metal workers in the Madrid area.

There are several probable reasons for this setback to the Communists' long-standing goal of a national general strike:




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--Workers are worried about inviting repression from the right, and are disinclined to strike because of the increasingly difficult economic situation and growing unemployment.

--Communists have reportedly encountered resistance to strike action from non-Communists within the workers' commissions and strong opposition from the two principal non-Communist clandestine trade unions.

The Communists remain insistent, however, that some form of "democratic action by the masses" is required to put pressure on Juan Carlos' successor regime. They probably see the labor sector as offering the best opportunity for countering government efforts to isolate the Communists from the rest of the left.

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JORDAN-ISRAEL

The Jordanians are becoming increasingly irritated at Israeli overflights and have complained to the US about them.

Jordan's air force commander recently told the US defense attache in Amman that he had come under pressure from King Husayn to intercept the Israelis. The commander said the overflights had become insulting to the King and were causing morale problems among Jordanian pilots. He said that, although he did not want to lose aircraft in a confrontation with Israel or to invite Israeli retaliation, he had considered setting a trap for the Israelis that could result in a shoot-down. He saw little chance of success in such a venture. Although for the moment at least the Jordanians have reportedly elected not to challenge Israeli aircraft, this decision has led to increased grumbling in the military.

According to the Jordanians, the Israelis have recently increased the number of their penetrations of Jordan's air space and are now overflying Jordan once or twice a week.

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Although the Jordanian air force would be no match for the Israelis, continued overflights by Israeli aircraft could force Amman to take action.

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JAPAN

Japanese union leaders are looking for a face-saving gesture from the government so they can cut short the strike launched by railway and other public workers yesterday.

The illegal walkout, affecting nearly 19 million commuters, is designed to dramatize the demand of public employees for the right to strike—a contentious issue that has kept labor and government at loggerheads for more than 20 years. Union leaders apparently launched the strike with some reluctance. Originally the campaign was timed to coincide with the release of a definitive government decision on the issue, but the government delayed the release, and union leaders now fear that unless the strike is curtailed public opinion will turn against them. A similar walkout in 1973 resulted in widespread public indignation, aimed largely at the striking workers.

The government is unlikely to compromise in any meaningful way. Public employees have not only long been the most militant and politically active of all union workers, but they are also closely allied with the Socialist Party, the major opponent of the ruling Liberal Democrats. In any case, the conservatives undoubtedly calculate that popular reaction to the transportation tie-up will work to their advantage.

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FOR THE RECORD

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MEXICO: An anti-government union faction may try to hold a large rally in Mexico City today in defiance of a government ban. The downtown site is near the US embassy; a violent clash with police is possible. Members of the faction, who were expelled by the government early this year from an electrical workers union, which they dominated, have the support of several far left worker, student, and farmer organizations in their effort to regain control of the union. The government is concerned that this support will erode its own control of labor and grow into a strong challenge from a united left—something the government has not had to worry about since the student problems of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Echeverria administration has called for the support of the entire government-run labor establishment to beat back the challenge.

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THAILAND-LAOS: The Lao government, as a demonstration of "good intention," has given permission for Thailand to remove the patrol boat grounded in the Mekong River during an incident on November 17. Vientiane has emphasized, however, that the boat is in Lao territory and has asked that the Thai inform Laos in advance of the time and date of the recovery operation. Two factors probably contributed to the Lao decision: recognition that a prolonged cut-off of goods from Thailand, particularly gasoline, hurt the Lao more than the Thai, and a belief that Laos had already derived the maximum propaganda mileage from the incident.

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ANNEX

The Political Opposition in Spain

The political opposition in Spain has been weakened by nearly four decades of proscription and today consists, for the most part, of poorly organized survivors of political parties and regional organizations.

Many of the groups have "exile" as well as "interior" party structures. Personalities are often more important than the groups they lead, and rival factions are divided as much by their devotion to different leaders as by ideology. Opposition leaders last year attempted to overcome differences by moving to combine their parties into a coalition. They made some progress, but the emergence of two rival coalitions destroyed any visions of a unified front.

The initiative for a merger came from the Communists, who pushed the formation of the Democratic Junta in the summer of 1974. The Junta fell far short of Communist hopes, mainly because of a legacy of distrust among Spanish leftists, who remember the ruthless Communist purges of anarchists, Socialists, and others during the closing days of the Spanish Civil War. Most Socialists and Christian Democrats refused to join. The most important non-Communist party to join was Tierno Galvan's Popular Socialists. Tierno has considerable personal prestige and some influence in leftist circles, but his group is very small and lacks popular support.

Easily the Strongest

The Communists are easily the strongest and best-organized force in the opposition. They number about 5,000 active members in Spain and at least twice that many abroad, mostly in France. The party, outlawed since the end of the Civil War, was harshly repressed by the Franco government—in contrast to Franco's toleration of many other opposition parties—and Communist leaders have rarely ventured into Spain. Santiago Carrillo, now 60 and living in Paris, has been secretary general since Dolores Ibarruri accepted the honorific title of party president in 1960.

The main source of the Communists' strength is their dominance over most of the workers' commissions formed in the 1960s. Communist organization, discipline, and financial backing have helped make the commissions the most dynamic political mechanism available to the Spanish worker. The commissions will be particularly useful to the Communists if King Juan Carlos does not open other avenues by which the workers can take their grievances to management.

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The Communists also have at their disposal an instrument for political propaganda in *Radio Espana Independiente*, which broadcasts from Romania. The Communists find some support in the Spanish universities and have gained considerable influence in the media. Their attempts over many years to infiltrate the military have produced no apparent results. The basic Communist aim, however, has been to encourage the neutrality of the military during the post-Franco evolution of Spain's political system.

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On international issues, the attitudes and positions of the Spanish Communists are close to those of the Italian Communists. Carrillo's relations with Moscow have been particularly strained since he denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like Berlinguer, Carrillo stresses his independence from Moscow and has criticized the Portuguese Communists for their hard-line tactics. Carrillo professes to favor a more gradual approach to change. He recently said, for example, that he cannot object to the US military bases in Spain as long as the Soviets keep troops in Czechoslovakia.

A Rival Coalition

A second opposition coalition, the Platform of Democratic Convergence, was formed last summer as a counterweight to the Communist-controlled Junta. The Platform has some 15 opposition parties, organizations, and trade unions, but is dominated by Socialists and Christian Democrats. Its program calls for a new democratic constitution to create a federal state and a number of autonomous regions.

Most of the groups adhering to the Platform would accept gradual evolution toward a democracy like others in Western Europe—although there is considerable squabbling over how gradual the evolution can be. The Platform probably has tried

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to accommodate too many viewpoints. One extremist group recently withdrew to protest the Platform's moderation regarding the transition period, and another is expected to follow suit.

The Socialist Workers Party—the major Socialist faction in Spain—is the dominant force in the Platform and the Communists' main rival on the left. The Socialist Workers Party and its affiliated trade union were revitalized in 1972 after party "young turks" in Spain wrested control from "old guard" exiles in France. The party is now led by Felipe Gonzalez, a young, articulate lawyer from Seville.

Four Christian Democratic factions—Ruiz Gimenez' Christian Democratic Left and three regional groups—have joined the Platform, and a fifth, Gil Robles' Popular Democratic Federation, is expected to join soon. Gil Robles and Ruiz Gimenez say that the various Christian Democratic factions are already collaborating closely, and that some form of union is inevitable, but the diversity and bitter personal rivalries among these factions makes effective unity unlikely.

Little Cooperation

Cooperation between the Junta and the Platform coalition has been limited. In early September they did join in condemning the government's new law on terrorism and its execution of five terrorists. A few days later, Carrillo misrepresented the joint communique as an agreement on a common program, leading several Platform groups to issue immediate denials. In spite of the friction, the two again issued a joint communique at the end of October, this time setting out objectives for the transition period. Agreement, however, took two weeks of arduous negotiation and some major concessions from the Communists.

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Major differences do separate the two coalitions:

--The Communists and others in the Junta reportedly hope to merge the two coalitions into a single popular front. Platform leaders are not prepared to go beyond establishing a committee of coordination.

--The Junta believes that the structure of the Spanish government must be completely reorganized. Platform leaders believe that modification of the existing structure will be sufficient.

--The two differ over how to handle demands for autonomy in the Basque provinces and Catalonia.

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All opposition groups are in general agreement that the two most pressing issues in post-Franco Spain will be amnesty for political prisoners and legalization of political parties. The partial amnesty issued by Juan Carlos on November 26 has done little to reduce tensions on this important issue. The royal pardon, which commutes death sentences for crimes prior to Juan Carlos' investiture on November 22 and reduces some prison sentences, falls far short of the opposition demands for a general amnesty for all political prisoners. The decree excludes Communists as well as terrorists, anarchists, and separatists from the reduced sentences.


There are deep disagreements among Spain's established leaders over whether actions such as amnesty and legalization of parties should be taken and, if they are, whether the Communists should be included. At this point, Juan Carlos seems likely to exclude the Communists. Some members of the opposition believe that exclusion will only benefit the Communists and that the Communists could be challenged more effectively in open competition. The Communists would almost certainly react to exclusion by stepping up their opposition to Juan Carlos.

The King probably believes that excluding the Communists would be an acceptable risk, in view of the pressure he will come under from conservative members of the establishment. Jose Antonio Giron—a powerful Falangist politician—and other prominent figures of the far right have publicly condemned the idea of active political parties in Spain. Juan Carlos knows that Giron and his followers have played a major role over the past year in scuttling Prime Minister Arias' limited moves toward political pluralism.

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